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BOOK REVIEW 
In the Tradition of Nelson 
The Royal Navy in World War n 
Robert Vogel 
Correlli Barnett: Engage the Enemy More Closely 
The Royal Navy in the Second World War. New 
York: W.W. Norton & Co., 1991. 
T he attempt to encompass in a single volume the history of the Royal Navy during the 
Second World War calls for careful judgement 
and considerable restraint. Barnett manages 
to do both in his Engage the Enemy More 
Closely, the first serious full-length study of 
the Royal Navy since Roskill's magisterial The 
War at Sea. But this book is not simply an 
account of the operations of the Royal Navy 
during the war. The structure of the book is 
informed by Barnett's major premise that the 
Royal Navy was the wall behind which, for the 
first three years of war, the British Army and 
the Royal Air Force gathered the strength 
necessary to help defeat the German, Italian 
and Japanese enemy. Consequently, unlike 
the other two services, the Navy had to fight its 
major battles largely with the organization and 
the material with which it had entered the war. 
The defeat of the U-boats, which had posed the 
greatest threat to British survival, the virtual 
annihilation of the German surface fleet and 
the struggle in the Mediterranean leading to 
the surrender of the Italian Fleet were 
accomplished, for the most part, with the 
somewhat outdated weapons with which the 
Royal Navy began the war. The operations 
leading to these victories, completed by 1943, 
are described with clarity and with an eye on 
the major strategic decisions taken at the 
centre of the British wartime leadership. They 
take up about two-thirds of the nearly 1000 
pages of Barnett's work. In many respects all 
these operations were basically defensive in 
character and, given Churchill's penchant for 
offensive operations, the Royal Navy never 
received the kind of priority which its 
importance to the British war effort clearly 
warranted, a point which is particularly strongly 
made in Chapter 15, 'The Battle oftheAir.' The 
debate about providing the Navy with sufficient 
long-range aircraft to help defeat the U-boats 
was, in Barnett's view, " ... the most important 
single strategic debate of the war. It is, 
moreover, the one case where Britain's survival 
was imperilled not so much by enemy action in 
itself as by blind folly within Britain's own 
leadership.''(p.4 76) 
The last third of the book is devoted to the 
period after 1943. The preparations and the 
organization for the D-day landings, Operation 
"Neptune," are given nearly one hundred pages 
and are described, surely correctly, as one of 
the outstanding feats of staff work ever to be 
performed by any military organization. 
Admiral Ramsay correctly gets all the credit for 
this. The last chapter deals with the British 
participation in the war against Japan. The 
relatively small part which the Royal Navy was 
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Admiral Sir Bertram Ramsay 
able to play in that great maritime conflict was, 
in Barnett's view, the direct result ofthe failure 
to provide the Fleet with the kind of modern 
equipment which had become standard in the 
U.S. Navy. 
Barnett naturally builds on his previous 
work with respect to the great failure of Britain 
to maintain its industrial and military strength 
following the First World War. The prologue, 
entitled, The German Ensign will be hauled 
down at Sunset,' has many harsh things to say 
about the Navy's performance during the First 
World War-many of them already rehearsed 
in Barnett's essay on Jellicoe in The 
Swordbearers, but the conclusion of the 
prologue, "And indeed the root causes of all the 
Navy's coming tribulations and enduring 
142 
strategic dilemmas during the Second World 
War, of its worst disasters and most tragic 
losses, are to be found in the twenty years of 
national illusion, neglect and belated awakening 
that had gone before," sets the tone for much 
of the first section of the book. Like the whine 
of a bearing running hot, Barnett again and 
again blames the failures and tragedies of the 
early part of the war on the 'lost years.' There 
were many such failures-among the most 
important of course were the diplomatic 
decisions which led to the great reduction in 
the Fleet, without reducing its responsibilities, 
which in turn led to the loss of the highly 
technical naval ship-building capacity of British 
maritime industry, all part of the general loss 
of Britain's industrial leadership. Barnett also 
draws attention to many other aspects of the 
loss of this leadership both inside and outside 
the Navy, 
Admiral of the Fleet Sir Andrew Cunningham 
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HMS Warspite 
A Ship of the Line 
HMS Warspite's last engagement: The bombardment ojWalcheren Island, November 1944. 
(Imperial War Museum. A 23916) 
The one ship that one might say justified the Royal Navy'sfaith in battleships. The seventh ship bearing 
her name, she lay in the line at Jutland and was present when the German fleet surrendered. In the Second World 
War she sank German destroyers at Narvik and Italian cruisers at Matapan; she engaged, hit and put to flight 
two Italian cruisers off Calabria; she served as Cunningham's Flagship throughout her time in the Mediterranean. 
Badly hit off Crete, she sailed around the world to be repaired at Bremerton Naval Base in Seattle and sailed from 
Vancouver to Tricomalee to become the Flagship and the only 'Jast" ship in Somerville's Eastern Fleet. She was 
back in the Mediterranean for Operation "Husky" and was again the FLagship when the Italianfleet surrendered. 
Now her main enemies became the German Army and the German Air Force. At Salerno where her guns were 
used against the German Army, she was attacked by the newest of weapons, radio-controlled (smart) bombs. 
Three were launched against her, one was a near-miss and one penetrated the ship causing extensive damage. 
Nevertheless she was back on station firing her guns at the German Army during the Normandy campaign and 
ended her career supporting the Canadian Army's Walcher en operations to open the Scheldt in November 1944. 
Throughout her thirty years of service she had a marked tendency to jam her rudder while turning at high 
speed, which no amount of refits and repairs could alter. She turned two full circles towards the German Fleet 
at Jutland and the whole of the German van concentrated its fire on her. She often repeated this peculiar maneuver 
during the Second World War and, when she was finally being towed to the breaker's yard, her stubborn and 
independent spirit reasserted itself and she broke her tow and beached herself on the coast of Cornwall. Nothing 
could be done to pull her o.ff and she had to be broken up ashore at Prussia Cove. "Belli dura despicio." 
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HMS Illustrious returning to duty in 1942 after being hit by 12 bombs-ajeat which no other class of carriers could 
have survived. At the time it was one of the world's most modem carriers but it was still equipped with some 
very old fashioned biplanes. As Barnett correctly underlines, this discrepancy was due mainly to neglect by the 
Royal Air Force which never understood the need for adequate carrier planes in the inter-war period. By the time 
the Navy became responsible it was already too late. 
such as the lack of adequate carrier planes, the 
failure to adopt the tachymetric fire-control for 
the Fleet's anti-aircraft weapons, the continuing 
emphasis in Admiralty planning on large Fleet 
actions, based mainly on the assumption that 
the main maritime enemy would be Japan; 
indeed the Navy is described as having a neo-
Victorian character during the inter-war years. 
Perhaps so, but it was a character that 
nevertheless enabled it, with its outdated 
weapons, to take the Army out of harms way-
from Norway, from France, from Greece, to 
prevent an invasion of the British Isles and to 
keep open the sea-lanes, despite the terrible 
losses which were sustained during that time. 
It was after all the determination, the dedication 
and the professionalism, as Barnett points 
out, which allowed the Fleet to win the defensive 
war against Germany and the more offensive 
one against Italy. 
144 
Barnett has some very strong views on a 
variety of strategic issues. Most particularly of 
course he regards the whole Mediterranean 
campaign as a major error and within that 
'blue water' strategy, the defence of Malta is 
described as "less as a British strategic asset 
than as a hostage to the enemy" (p.491) One 
does not have to agree with him on all of his 
views, particularly since we are given no real 
alternatives, but one has to recognize the 
cogency and clarity of his arguments. And 
again it was the failures of British diplomacy 
during the inter-war years which were, 
according to Barnett, the main reasons for 
British defeats, particularly the failure to renew 
the Japanese alliance and the unnecessary 
alienation ofMussolini. "On 7 December Britain 
found herself at war with three great powers 
simultaneously-the pre-war Chiefs of Staffs 
ultimate nightmare. The moment ofbankruptcy 
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for British 'total strategy' since the end of the 
Great War had arrived." (p.377) Surely it is 
here that Barnett has pushed his thesis too 
far-was British diplomacy really in a position 
to alter the course of Italian and Japanese 
policy? Barnett dedicates his book to Stephen 
Roskill, whose work he clearly recognizes as 
being the unrivalled record of 
the Royal Navy during the War. 
Perhaps he should sometimes 
have taken note ofRoskill's more 
measured conclusions. For 
instance, Roskill ends his 
account of the surrender of the 
Italian Fleet with" ... he closed a 
chapter in British history which, 
but for the unscrupulous 
opportunism of a dictator, need 
never have been written." 
(Roskill, Vol. III, part I, pp.169-
1 70) Barnett concludes his, 
very similar account of that 
surrender with ". . . the Italian 
menace so quixotically and 
unnecessarily raised up by 
British diplomacy (and public 
opinion) in the Abyssinian crisis 
of 1935-36 had at last been 
removed. "(p.670) Surely 
Mussolini's declaration of war 
in June 1940 owed more to his 
opportunism than to his 
resentment ofBritish opposition 
to his, in any case successful, 
Abyssinian adventure five years 
earlier. Perhaps there were 
some things over which British 
diplomacy had little control 
during these crucial years. 
view of the First Sea Lord, Admiral Pound, in 
suggesting that he was not really fit for the 
position which he held throughout the crucial 
years. Yet Pound was often right in his views 
and managed in those early years, before the 
Chiefs of Staff Committee had really learned to 
cope, at least partially, with its impetuous 
The leadership of the Royal 
Navy during the war has not 
produced the kind of 
controversy among historians 
Admiral of the Fleet 
Sir Dudley Pound 
leader, to prevent Churchill 
from carrying out his more 
outrageous ideas, such as 
Operation "Catherine." He also, 
as Barnett relates, prevented 
him from interfering with 
Harwood's tactics in the Battle 
of the River Plate. He could not 
prevent such interference 
during the Norwegian 
Campaign, and as the tragedy 
of PQ 17 illustrated, he was 
prone to interfere himself. Still 
he did lead the Royal Navy 
through its most difficult time 
and, if he was not a great 
strategic mind, he was right 
about a good many things such 
as the dispatch of Force Z, and 
often where Barnett faults him 
there is room for debate. For 
instance over the absolutely 
crucial question of the 
disposition of the Fleet in the 
summer of 1940, Barnett 
suggests that Forbes was right 
about the impossibility of an 
invasion and that therefore the 
disposition of the Fleet's 
destroyers and cruisers was 
wasteful and dangerous. That 
is surely hindsight, given what 
the Germans had managed in 
Norway. Indeed while air 
superiority was unquestionably 
important. its importance has 
often been greatly exaggerated, 
which has engendered a veritable flood ofbooks 
on the Bomber Offensive and the campaigns in 
Italy and North-West Europe. It produced 
neither a monomaniac, like Harris, nor an 
egomaniac like Montgomery. Its admirals, 
despite the locust years, were largely competent 
professionals, and, in the Navy, the price of 
failure, like that of Holland and Phillips, was 
very often death. Barnett follows the traditional 
especially in the early part of the war. The 
Royal Navy managed to get the British Army 
both to and from Norway without it, from 
Dunkirk while it was in dispute and from 
Greece with the Germans in absolute control of 
the air. Moreover despite the total air superiority 
which the Germans enjoyed in the eastern 
Mediterranean, not a single German soldier 
managed to get to Crete by sea. No doubt the 
145 
5
Vogel: In the Tradition of Nelson: The Royal Navy in World War II
Published by Scholars Commons @ Laurier, 1993
cost was high, but surely Pound was right in 
maintaining his Fleet in a position which could 
prevent a high-stakes German gamble from 
paying off. Pound originally opposed the attack 
on the French Fleet and, in one of the very few 
important omissions in this book, Barnett fails 
to explain that he changed his mind when the 
French battleship Richelieu, which Pound 
considered to be one ofthe most powerful ships 
afloat, sailed from Dakar on June 25th, 
presumably on her way to France. She turned 
back when intercepted by H.M.S. Dorsetshire 
on the 27th but not before Pound had to make 
major changes in the disposition of some of his 
main units. It was after this that he would no 
longer trust Darlan's word and shifted his 
support to Churchill's proposals. Barnett's 
summary of Pound's record as First Sea Lord 
(pp. 731-734), while somewhat more 
complimentary than his original introduction 
of him (pp. 50-51) might have emphasized 
more of his positive contributions to the Royal 
Navy's most difficult but, in the final analysis, 
successful years. 
Barnett has really only one standard against 
which to measure the sailors of this war. That 
standard is Nelson, who, although mentioned 
only three times in the index, is used almost as 
an adjective so often that one loses count after 
thirty odd mentions of him. Kennedy (of the 
Rawalpindi) was "obedient to Nelson's 
spirit."(p.74) Langsdorff took "un-Nelsonian 
decisions."(p.86) "Nothing could have been 
more Nelsonian" than Warburton-Lee's 
actions.(p.ll6) "Churchill confronted it [the 
problem of the French Fleet] with the ruthless 
decision ... of a Nelson."(p.l73) Cunningham 
had " ... a spare and muscular body tense with 
a Nelsonian impatience for action ... "(p.272) 
Tovey spoke ". . . in language with a true 
Nelsonian ring .... " (p.314) H.M.S. Valiant 
". . . fired five [salvoes] in just over three 
minutes, a rate faithful to the traditions of 
Nelson'sMediterraneanFleet ... " (p.343), Vian's 
tactics were "absolutely true to the tradition of 
Hawke and Nelson ... ," (p.500) Mountbatten 
" ... rivalled Nelson in his hunger for admiration 
and surpassed him in his appetite for personal 
aggrandizement. .. "(p.869). 
146 
The end of the war, in Barnett's view, also 
marked the end of British sea power, " ... it was 
like a ship still on even keel, not yet perceptibly 
lower in the water, but with her bottom blown 
out. "(p.881) Despite the acerbic criticism which 
Barnett directs at British inter-war and even 
war policy, there is no doubt that he judges 
that the performance ofthe Royal Navy during 
the war, despite its flawed weapons and its 
mistaken faith in the battleship, was wholly 
admirable. Unlike Roskill, he does not explicitly 
attribute this to the survival ofthe traditions of 
the Service. Yet his conclusion is both true and 
as, he himself suggests, contains a "poignant 
paradox ... Adversity had rescued the Navy 
from the arrogant complacency bequeathed by 
the Victorian era, and which had marred its 
performance in the Great War; had awoken it 
from the conservatism and torpor of the inter-
war years; and had restored it to the bold, 
hardy, resourceful and highly professional 
service that it was in Nelson's time."(p.881) 
This is certainly the ultimate compliment by 
Barnett's standards. But surely the paradox is 
that it was precisely the respect for tradition, 
the conservatism which he so often criticizes, 
even its faith in battleships, that enabled the 
Royal Navy to perform its duty with such elan 
and success during the Second World War. 
Robert Vogel is Professor of History at 
McGill University and co-author of the 
Maple LeqfRoute series. Professor Vogel is 
a Contributing Editor of CMH. 
Opposite: Night attack on a German U-boat: Dropping 
flares, an RAF Coastal Command plane attacks a 
German submarine from 75 feet. A depth charge can 
be seen exploding near the centre of the photo 
(Official U.S. Air Force Photo 54635 AC) 
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1:ig the mitseum's own specialists" 
"invaluable for the historiaii,. tesearc~. stui:1ent ()T; teacher; an indispenstble read for all 
with an interest in conterrtp<)r:aty history or museums" 
E Ieven hisrorical articles principally by the 
staff of the Imperial War Museum shed new 
light on aspects of the two world wars. 
Army photographers in North-West Europe 
Two Fusiliers: the First World War friendship of 
Robert Graves and Siegfried Sassoon 
War propaganda and fascist myth: the poster 
collections of the Micheletti Foundation, Brescia 
Early paintings of the Great War 
'Keep smiling, keep those chins up and God Bless': 
filmed messages home from service personnel in 
the Far East during the Second World War 
Post-war construction as depicted in official British 
films of the Second World War 
'Large Slow Targets': the Royal Navy's LST (2) 
Fleet in the Second World War 
'The Nwnber One Radio Personality of the War': 
Lord Haw Haw and his British audience during the 
Phoney War 
The inevitable victory? El Alamein revisited 
'The drama of the larder'; Germany's food crisis 
1914-1918 
'The most lion-hearted man I ever met': 
Commander J W Tubby' Linton VC 
Paperback; 112 pages; richly illustrated with 
colour and black and white illustrations. 
Price £9.50; postage, add £2.50 for UK, £3.50 for 
overseas. 
Imperial War Muse11m Review: an in-depth series 
from Britain's national archive of twentieth 
century warfare. Buy the back numbers to make 
up your set- Reviews I, 2, 3, 4, 5, and 6 are stiU 
available. 
Contents lists l!aD be sent on request. 
II 
MUSEUM 
PUBLICATIONS 
ORDER FORM 
Please send me --copy/copies of 
the Imperial War Museum Review as 
indicated below: No. of copies 
REVIEW a £9.50 
REVIEWB £8.95 
REVIEWIIII £8.95 
REVIEWal £7.95 
REVIEWIIII £7.95 
REVIEWB £5.95 
REVIEW mil £5.95 
Add for postage and packing (prices correct until! April 
1993): for 1 copy, £2.50 UK, £3.50 overseas; for 2-4 
copies, £4.50 UK, £6.50 overseas; for 5-7 copies. £6.50 
UK, £9.50 overseas. 
I enclose a cheque/postal order made payable to 
The Imperial War Museum for £ 
or debit my Access/Visa/Master card no. 
I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I 
Signature 
Expiry date 
or 1 enclose an official order form and wish to be 0 
invoiced. (This applies to schools and colleges only) 
Name 
Address 
Please return this form to: Mail Order 
Imperial War Museum 
Duxford Airfield 
Cambridge CB2 4QR 
Telephone: 0223 835000 x 245 
(24 hour answerphone) 
Published every autumn 
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